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On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice
by Jens David Ohlin
The phrase "transitional justice" has had an amazingly successful career at an early
age.' Popularized as an academic concept in the early 1990s in the aftermath of
apartheid's collapse in South Africa, the phrase quickly gained traction in a variety of
global contexts, including Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone.2 A
sizeable literature has been generated around it, so much so that one might even call
it a sub-discipline with inter-disciplinary qualities. 3 Nonetheless, the concept remains
an enigma. It defines the contours of an entire field of intellectual inquiry, yet at the
same time it hides more than it illuminates. No one is exactly sure what it means.
One reason might be its combination of two very different kinds of words in a
single phrase. "Justice" is perhaps the greatest of moral values, with a history that
extends back to the moment man started criticizing the conduct of his fellow man.
It is meant to evoke a universal, normative goal. "Transitional," on the other hand,
defines a particular situation, an exceptional and limited moment that stands in
contrast to the universal goal. So the second term limits and qualifies the first in
some important way, but how is totally unclear.
Is transitional justice some other kind of justice, fundamentally different from
justice during non-transitional moments? Or is it simply ordinary justice, a familiar
end-state that remains elusive because a society has been ripped apart by genocide or
some other ethnic conflict?4 If it is the latter, the field is about how to achieve, in a
very pragmatic way, the usual goals of justice in difficult times. If it is the former, the
field fundamentally re-conceives our understanding of justice in the face of radical
social violence. 5 One is largely an exercise in social science, the other an exercise in
moral philosophy. The current field of transitional justice straddles this distinction,
and does so, I shall argue, in a somewhat uncomfortable way. Although the concept
now dominates international affairs as an umbrella under which these problems are
investigated, it remains fundamentally misunderstood. Specifically, the term
"transitional justice" betrays a deep tension between two approaches to justice that
goes to the heart of the burgeoning program of international criminal justice.
Jens David Ohlin is an Associate-in-Law at Columbia University School of Law. Dr. Ohlin
received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University, and his J.D. from Columbia University
School of Law.
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Two CONCEPTIONS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice can be interpreted in two different ways. In the first,
transitional justice is just ordinary justice where the material circumstances make it
difficult to achieve. What is meant by ordinary justice? Simply that the usual goals
and rules of justice apply: to hold violators responsible for their actions and punish
them accordingly, after a rigorous process of determining their guilt before a neutral
decision maker.6 This view of justice implies many things; it implies, for example,
that there can be no peace without justice for past abuses-that at least some form
of punishment is required to restore balance to the moral order of a community. But
this view of justice also implies many defendant-centered protections: that due
process of law is respected (both in procedure and substance), that criminal
defendants are punished according to public and prospective laws, and that
procedural protections for defendants are a precondition of meaningful justice.
These are the universal background conditions of ordinary justice, and apply in any
sophisticated legal order committed to the rule of law.
Is transitional justice some other kind of justice,
fundamentally different from justice during non-
transitional moments? Or is it simply ordinary justice, a
familiar end-state that remains elusive because a society
has been ripped apart?
A view of transitional justice as ordinary justice requires that the basic rules of
justice apply in all situations, including extraordinary moments after genocide, war,
and ethnic conflict. Though all of the regular rules of justice apply, implementing
them is a difficult policy matter to be investigated by theorists of transitional justice.
All sorts of policy matters might be considered here, such as what kind of tribunal
to constitute, 7 how to integrate warring ethnic powers into a coherent cosmopolitan
whole,8 and how to minimize future conflicts from flaring up again.9 Yet these are all
pragmatic questions and do not implicate the most basic foundations of our
conception of justice.'( The work of transitional justice, in this view, does not
require revising the basic principles of justice; rather, it is a more modest inquiry into
the appropriate institutional arrangements to achieve peace.
This is to be contrasted with transitional justice as a special kind of justice,
where the regular rules of justice are supplanted by novel rules justified by the
extraordinary nature of the moral fissure. This conception focuses on the goal of
rebuilding broken communities-an imperative so important for both morality and
law that the basic principles of justice are subject to revision." In this conception,
then, the difficulties inherent within a broken society are more than just pragmatic
considerations that make peace difficult to achieve. Rather, they serve as reasons for
tinkering with the basic principles of justice.' 2 This view opens up a conceptual space
within which new rules of justice are required, consistent with the demands of the
time.
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There is a logical appeal to this view of transitional justice. If one believes that
basic principles of justice are abstract entities, residing as Platonic forms waiting for
human theorists to pluck them from the ether, then it can be a little confusing to
think of them as subject to revision when circumstances dictate. It would appear to
violate our intuition that justice, whatever it is, is eternal and for the ages. However,
if we view morality, with Hume, as stemming from basic background conditions of
society, it would make sense that new rules are needed in societies so broken that
they do not have the same background conditions.13 In modern societies, where law
and government retain power, we live our lives within a socio-economic order with
institutional avenues of redress when things go wrong. But in the midst of genocide
and its aftermath, institutions disappear and participants are thrown into a chaotic
hell that can only be described as a state of nature. This is why both Hobbes and
Locke argued that more primitive laws applied in the state of nature and the rich
program of rules known as the rule of law only come into force when the state of
nature is replaced by a social contract, and hence, civilization.' 4 In the face of
genocide, societies collapse back into a state of nature, quite literally and horrifically,
and it is no wonder that a conceptual space opens up where different rules of justice
might applys This is the world of Hobbes and Locke.
One sees this view of transitional justice as special justice most often in
questions of legal procedure. Normal justice requires a whole set of procedural
protections for defendants. The right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right
to confront witnesses and evidence are all constitutive of due process and the notion
of a fair trial; without these procedural protections, a justice system would be
arbitrary and capricious and could not rightly be described as acting under the rule
of law. Nevertheless, these procedural protections are sometimes suspended during
moments of radical social violence through the establishment of alternate
institutions of justice-the rationale being that standard rules of justice are either
too burdensome given the circumstances, or unwarranted. The key to transitional
justice is that justice be served for the victims, one might say, and that the normal
safeguards of procedural justice are developed within the context of regular criminal
behavior, not mass atrocity. One might have made this argument, for example, in
Rwanda, where there was an initial attempt to conduct "regular" trials for
genotidaires.16 This program was quickly abandoned after officials imprisoned tens of
thousands of defendants, but had no lawyers or resources to bring them to trial. The
result was community-based gacaca courts that operated far below traditional legal
standards of due process. This struck some skeptics as unjust, but to proponents it
seemed necessary to achieve "justice" for the community and the victims, even if due
process had to fall by the wayside.17 In this case, the basic principles of justice were
subject to revision. Ordinary justice usually abhors such brazen utilitarian balancing
of rights.
This example suggests a basic distinction between our two models of
transitional justice. Transitional justice as special justice is particularly focused on
collective action-that of both victims and perpetrators. Mass atrocities are usually
committed by one group against another; the paradigmatic case of genocide is one
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ethnic group (not just a psychotic individual) that seeks the annihilation of another
group.' 8 In addition to any individual moral and legal culpability, the groups stand
against each other in a particular relationship as victim and perpetrator. This raises a
host of moral as well as geopolitical problems, not the least of which is the threat of
regional instability as victimized ethnic groups respond with reprisals against their
oppressors.19 It is precisely these inter-group conflicts that transitional justice seeks
to resolve by making sure that the victim-group gets justice and the moral balance of
power is restored. This focus on the collective as the primary goal of special justice
allows the interests of individuals to be sidetracked, not as entirely irrelevant perhaps,
but as dwarfed by the larger problems of collective strife.20 The proponent of special
justice might therefore defend the repeal of individual procedural protections and
respond to any complaints as being beside the point. What we are doing here, he
might say, is repairing societies-a Herculean task if ever there was one-and this is
our warrant for rewriting the basic principles of justice.
In contrast, transitional justice as ordinary justice is less concerned with the
actions of collectives, mostly because the collective is only relevant when the crime
in question is genocidal in nature. In times of relative peace, ordinary justice is
concerned with the lives of individuals and their interactions with each other, when
ordinary justice can train its gaze on making sure that each individual receives what
justice demands. It is for this reason that the protections of the criminal trial are so
central in ordinary justice. Of course, there are individual victims who matter as well.
It is a calculus of individual victim and individual perpetrator-individuals both. In
ordinary justice, no group-level considerations warrant special exceptions to
generally recognized principles of justice.
None of this is meant to suggest that the two conceptions of transitional
justice-as ordinary justice and as special justice-are mutually exclusive. One might
find elements of both in many places. Indeed, as I shall argue in the third section,
both conceptions are present at the very foundation of the new institutions of
international criminal justice. But before pursuing this line of thought, it is important
to evaluate arguments about transitional justice, identify where they go wrong, and
suggest how they might be reformulated to address these concerns.
SPECIOUS ARGUMENTS ABOUT TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The conception of transitional justice as special justice is particularly susceptible
to specious arguments. As suggested in the previous section, special justice
encourages revision of the ordinary principles of justice in service of the laudable
goal of restoring collective peace and security. Although this might be warranted in
some circumstances, I will suggest here that the basic structure of this argument is
dangerous and might spawn unfortunate conclusions. The problem stems from a
willingness to make local exceptions to the basic rules of justice rather than seeking
wholesale changes that apply in all circumstances. I consider two major questions.
The first is whether the death penalty is an appropriate avenue of legal punishment
for the greatest of all crimes--genocide. The second is whether the unprecedented
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nature of World War II was reason enough to depart from the principle of legality,
or nullum crimen sine lege, during the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. What unifies
both is that each is susceptible to the dangers of viewing transitional justice as special
justice.
The Death Penaly for Genocide
In 2005, I published an article in the American Journal of InternationalLaw arguing
that, although a general norm of customary international law may be emerging that
prohibits the death penalty, this norm should not apply to cases of genocide. 21 Part
of the argument stemmed from traditional customary law analysis. 22 Simply put, few
nations crippled by genocide have refrained from the death penalty because of a
perceived duty under international law. Indeed, several countries resorted to the
death penalty as a response to genocide and war crimes, including Rwanda after its
genocide, the US and its Allies at Nuremberg, and Israel after it captured
Eichmann.23 In cases where the death penalty was prohibited-at the Yugoslavian
tribunal, for example-it was because European abolitionist countries on the
Security Council used the threat of their veto power to keep capital punishment off
the table.
24
If the death penalty is available for a regular case of
murder, how is it just, one might ask, for a perpetrator of
genocide to live out the remainder of his life detained in
the Hague or some other Western European prison?
Dramatic events have unfolded since the original article was published. Saddam
Hussein was brought to the gallows in a macabre moment captured both by official
newsreel and unofficial cell-phone camera. People around the world were shocked by
images of Hussein with a noose around his neck and were horrified by the religious
and political taunts during the final moments of what should have been a dignified
and solemn end to a sober legal process. Although there is much to be criticized in
an execution carried out in such fashion, we must carefully note that the criminal trial
that preceded it lacked the safeguards and sophistication of a well-developed legal
system. It would be an exaggeration to call it a kangaroo court or a show trial; it
would be more accurate to call it a well-intentioned effort from a nation whose legal
system remained underdeveloped for the simple reason that Hussein himself never
allowed one to flourish. Had the trial been conducted with legal rigor, and the
execution conducted with the necessary gravitas, the outcome might have been more
legitimate.25 As it stands, the execution seemed more like sectarian violence than
national reconciliation, and ought to be criticized on that basis. However, these
criticisms do not implicate the basic structure of my original argument: although
many nations have abolished the death penalty, few nations actually victimized by
genocide willingly forego executions for genocidal criminals.
The structure of my original argument can easily be misinterpreted. A central
element of the argument is that context is relevant and that societies ripped apart by
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genocide must rebuild themselves, lest they fall back into ethnic violence that could
destabilize an entire region. This need to rebuild societies and restore regional order
is paramount for international law, whose prime objective, codified in the UN
Charter, is the maintenance of international peace and security.26 Within this context,
victims of genocide must feel that perpetrators will be adequately punished for their
crimes. Light punishments run the risk of being viewed as illegitimate by the victim
population, especially in a nation that retains the death penalty in its domestic penal
system for regular crimes. 27 If the death penalty is available for a regular case of
murder, how is it just, they might ask, for a perpetrator of genocide to live out the
remainder of his life detained in the Hague or some other Western European
prison?
28
The moral argument for allowing the death penalty for
crimes of genocide denies that there is such a thing as an
absolute right to life in all circumstances, which cannot be
violated.
If a criminal justice system is viewed as illegitimate in the wake of genocide, the
consequence is more than just a scholarly anxiety. Victims are persuaded to lay down
their arms and forgo reprisals on the assumption that justice can be accomplished in
the courtroom, through the rule of law, with individual accountability for specific
criminal actions. To the extent that victims lose faith in this process, they will take
their arms and engage in violent, self-help initiatives. Indeed, it is precisely this fear
that gives the international community the right, the duty, and the jurisdiction to
intervene in such cases and create a process of international criminal justice. 29 When
the Security Council authorized the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, it did so
explicitly by invoking its Chapter VII authority to restore collective peace and
security, and upon a factual finding that a criminal tribunal was necessary for this
end.30
One can already see the danger of this argument; it would seem as if its
structure implies that transitional justice requires the death penalty for genocide,
even though it may be impermissible in other contexts, as the project of transitional
justice might otherwise collapse. Since some victims demand capital punishment for
genocide-feeling, legitimately, as if a twenty-year sentence would be inadequate for
a genocidal conspirator responsible for the death of thousands of civilians-then
the basic rules of justice must be altered within the context of transitional justice.
This is an exercise in exceptionalism par excellence. Under this view, we make an
exception to the basic rules of justice-rewrite them for the occasion, as it were-
because transitional justice has its own needs, its own arguments, and its own internal
logic.
This is, of course, the very kind of argument we must remain vigilant against
and it would be a pity if my argument about the death penalty were misunderstood
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in this fashion. How best to interpret the argument, then, so that it does not run
afoul of this problem? How do we understand the death penalty without resorting
to some brand of exceptionalism about justice? This objection fails to distinguish the
moral argument from the legal argument. Any analysis that confuses the two will
undoubtedly warp both; and the result will be confusion about transitional justice
and the role it plays in any generalized theory of justice.
The legal argument about the death penalty's permissibility in cases of genocide
appeals to transitional justice because the whole legal basis for UN involvement in
transitional justice is a threat to international peace and security. Indeed, as we have
mentioned before, the Security Council is unable to take any action under its Chapter
VII authority unless it finds that such action is required to restore collective peace
and security.31 This was precisely what the Security Council found when it authorized
the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR-that an international tribunal was a
necessary precondition for restoring regional stability and convincing victim groups
to forgo reprisal attacks, put down their arms, and litigate grievances about past
abuses in court. For example, the end of the Balkan wars left many Kosovo
Albanians angry and itching for revenge against ethnic Serbs. Similarly, the end of
the Rwandan genocide left the Tutsi population in control of the government but
poised for reprisals against former members of the Hutu Power movement who fled
to neighboring countries. In both instances, the risk of ongoing regional war was
very real.
The demands of transitional justice are therefore relevant to the legal argument.
Since international legal institutions such as the United Nations and the Security
Council only gain entry into the situation when there are larger implications for
collective security, it makes sense to frame the debate in terms that are relevant for
transitional justice. This was precisely the point of my argument in 2005: to suggest
that international tribunals that fail to recognize the death penalty for crimes of
genocide might frustrate the very goals they were originally constituted to achieve,
i.e., collective security.32 The point is to place the retentionist argument in terms
cognizable by international law and relevant for collective peace and security,
arguably the most important goal of international law. In this sense, then, the
demands of transitional justice are certainly relevant for the legal argument. This
implies a view of transitional justice as special justice, as a unique moment in
geopolitical history-hardly surprising given that international law's obsession with
collective peace and security is all about these unique moments and how to weather
them with the least violence.
This legal argument must be separated from the moral argument, which is
logically distinct. The moral argument for allowing the death penalty for crimes of
genocide denies that there is such a thing as an absolute right to life in all
circumstances, which cannot be violated.33 At first glance it might appear that the
moral argument is an exercise in precisely the kind of exceptionalism that I decried
as part of transitional justice as special justice. If we are claiming that the death
penalty's permissibility should be viewed differently in cases of genocide, it would
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appear that we are carving out a special logical space and using the facts of
transitional justice as our warrant for doing so.
But the moral argument does not suggest that there is an absolute right to life in
ordinary times and that the unique demands of transitional justice justify abrogation
of that right in service of greater utilitarian ends. This would be a disastrous moral
argument. Rather, the moral argument appeals to rights forfeiture, or the idea that
the genocidal criminal has forfeited his right to life by virtue of his actions. 34 This
consideration, when combined with the knowledge that simple prison terms may be
insufficient retributive punishment for the attempted annihilation of an entire race
or ethnicity, suggests the complicated conclusion that the death penalty for genocide
is entirely consistent with a generally recognized right to life. We are not in the
business of offering exceptions to this universal right. This would be to concede too
much. Rather, the retentionist is denying the right's universaity in the first place, on
the assumption that there are many instances where the right does not apply; and
chief among them is the genocidal criminal who has conspired to wipe out an entire
race.
The absolute novelty of the Nazi conspiracy, combined
with the shocking efficacy with which it was carried out,
meant that the international community had not
criminalized this behavior because they had never seen it
before.
Can the legal and the moral be separated so easily? Is not the legal argument, at
its heart, also a moral one? In other words, what is the point of the legal argument
unless it is meant to justify-both legally and morally-the use of the death penalty
in cases of genocide? The answer here is that the legal argument-which appeals to
transitional justice as special justice-is merely meant to frame the question in terms
familiar to international law, instead of pure human rights law as abolitionists would
have it.35 One might think of it as similar to a foundational,jusdicional question. In
other words, the subject of genocide is a concern for international lawyers because
it implicates questions of collective peace and security. And although collective peace
and security could not resolve, by itself, all questions about the law of genocide (how
it is defined, how it is prosecuted, etc.), it does nonetheless inform how the law of
genocide should be approached and why international law should encourage a
resolution that is considered just by local standards.
Within the space opened up by international law, the moral argument can
complete its work. Many activities are permissible by the standards of international
law, but whether they are advisable according to an all-things-considered moral
judgment is a different matter. It is precisely within this area that one would want to
prevent an argument that justifies unscrupulous conduct by appealing to the
demands of transitional justice. This would amount to utilitarian balancing of the
most egregious kind. Appealing to transitional justice at the level of international law,
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as was the case with our argument about the death penalty, is not only permissible,
but inevitable, and entirely consistent with the basic goals of the international legal
order.
The Nuremberg Legality Problem
Consider a second example where one might find the dangerous results of an
appeal to transitional justice as special justice. The most trenchant criticism of the
Nuremberg trials appealed to the principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege. The
Nazi defendants were charged with aggression, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, but there were few sources of law from which prosecutors could establish
that these crimes were already part of international law. While it is true that the
Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed aggressive war, there was absolutely nothing in the
very brief treaty that mentioned criminal liability for individuals for aggression, as
opposed to state responsibility for the conduct.36 Similar problems remained for the
charge of crimes against humanity.
For sixty years, a vigorous, highly theoretical debate about these problems has
lingered. The discussion continues because of the trial's overall importance for
Germany's war guilt, but perhaps more importantly because of Nuremberg's status
as the basic precedent upon which modern international criminal law is founded. In
the aftermath of World War II, there were only two logical possibilities. The first is
to deny that the prosecutions violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, and argue
that the defendants were charged with crimes that were already well established in
international law. This took a fair amount of creative lawyering and strategic
scholarship. 37 Certainly this was the strategy of the judges at the International
Military Tribunal, for they could never admit that their guilty verdicts violated one of
the most fundamental principles of criminal law 38 The judges went to great lengths
to demonstrate, in whatever tortured way they could, that there was nothing novel in
the convictions and that every crime was pre-existing in international law. There
could be no retroactive punishment.
The other logical possibility is to bite the bullet and admit that the prosecutions
violated the principle of legality, but also maintain that in this situation it was
justified. In many ways this is the more intellectually responsible position because it
avoids the difficult contortions involved in finding individual criminal liability for
aggression and crimes against humanity before 1945.39 Variations on this position
have been formulated and expressed by Kelsen and Cassese.4° In this case, although
nullum cimen sine lege is a basic principle of justice, the Allies were permitted to make
exceptions to this principle because of the extraordinary nature of the
circumstances. To refuse to prosecute on account of a commitment to nullum crimen
sine lege would hardly have satisfied Jewish victims of the Holocaust. This is clearly
an example of what I have called exceptionalism based on an appeal to transitional
justice as special justice.
Of course, the position is no doubt motivated by the fact that there were few
meaningful alternatives; what is often lost in these discussions is a concrete
alternative to the Nuremberg trials. In a sense, there were really only three options.
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The Allies could let Nazi leaders go free, the Allies could execute them on the
battlefield (as Churchill had assumed would be the case),41 or the Allies could put
them on trial with full knowledge that the prosecutions would not entirely conform
to the legality principle. Of course, the first option had to be rejected. Simply letting
the Nazis go free, to live out the rest of their lives in hiding in Argentina, or some
other distant country, would not have been an appropriate response to the horrors
of the Nazi regime. And although summary executions were certainly possible-
Churchill's position did have historical precedent, after all-it was much more
preferable to grant them at least most of the protections of due process and fairness
that would result from submitting their fate to a judicial decision maker.
As one can see, there are two possible versions of this argument. The first, naive
version, as I shall call it, simply says that the principle of legality was violated and
that the needs of transitional justice justified it as an exception to the general rule.
This suggests a broader implication, i.e., that the rules of justice are up for grabs in
times of transitional justice. As I have said before, this is precisely the kind of poor
argument that must be avoided. The second version of the argument-the nuanced
version, as I shall call it-rejects this calculus and appeals instead to Realpolitik. The
basic rules of justice are not subject to revision based on the demands of transitional
justice. All we can do is attempt to comply with as many of the universal rules of
justice as possible. And to the extent that circumstances prevent our total compliance
with the basic rules-including the principle of legality-we should make note of it
and move on. In this case, the absolute novelty of the Nazi conspiracy, combined
with the shocking efficacy with which it was carried out, meant that the international
community had not criminalized this behavior because they had never seen it before.42
This does not create exceptions to the basic rules of justice, but simply encourages
us to recognize when our international institutions fail to fully live up to them.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The inevitable question is whether we can eliminate the conception of
transitional justice as special justice-banish it, as it were-and replace it entirely
with the conception of transitional justice as ordinary justice. This would seem to be
the natural conclusion, if I am right that transitional justice as special justice can
promote specious reasoning. Our best course of action would be to revise our
understanding of transitional justice and limit it to its ordinary justice variety; but I
argue in this section that this revision is unlikely to succeed. I am a pessimist in this
regard because the tension between the two conceptions of transitional justice goes
to the very heart of international criminal justice; it is the inherent paradox upon
which the entire field is structured.
As discussed above, transitional justice as ordinary justice is particularly
concerned with the fate of individuals, while transitional justice as special justice
adds a distinct concern with the fate of collectives-ensuring that victim groups and
their aggressors peacefully co-exist, and opening up a special logical space to make
this happen. Ordinary justice, on the other hand, concentrates less on the collective
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aspect, content instead to ensure that individuals get what they deserve. The tension
exists at the very foundation of international criminal justice, which is at once
individual and collective. At the individual level, we are dealing with a system of
criminal law whose only concern is making sure that guilty individuals-and only the
guilty-are punished for their wrongdoing. The entire system of criminal law is
designed to achieve this end. We investigate crimes, prosecute wrongdoers, and
convene trials under the rules of evidence to make sure defendants are truly guilty
and the innocent go free. Most importantly, a society engages in these prosecutions
for the simple reason that wrongdoing must be punished. Justice demands it. This is
the internal logic of criminal law and it is inescapable. In criminal law, we do not pick
and choose between cases based on social considerations. What matters is whether
the law has been violated. All true criminal courts are convened for this purpose.
Genocide and crimes against humanity are by their nature
special, and some element of special justice must be
marshaled against them.
But international criminal law is also based on geopolitical considerations. As
noted above, the Security Council authorized the creation of the ICTY and ICTR
based on its Chapter VII authority to restore collective peace and security. The
Security Council would therefore have had no legal authority to unilaterally set up a
binding institution of criminal adjudication for individuals, butfor the presence of the
larger geopolitical considerations. The ICTY and ICTR were not created by
voluntary treaty commitments-this would have been entirely ineffective. Rather, the
Security Council created the ad hoc tribunals on its own initiative, imposed it on the
member states of the United Nations (some of whom were recalcitrant), 43 and made
it binding as a matter of international law by invoking Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.
One would think that the new International Criminal Court would be immune
from such considerations, since it was created by voluntary treaty commitments
through the Rome Statute. No state was forced to sign the treaty, and many have
declined to do so. However, the ICC is required to take cases referred to the
prosecutor by the Security Council when the Council deems a criminal investigation
necessary for the maintenance of the international peace and security.44 The Council
issued such a directive last year when it invoked its Chapter VII authority and
referred the Darfur situation to the court.45 The referral preempted the prosecutor's
discretion in the matter and directed him to conduct an investigation and commence
prosecutions for any wrongdoing.46
This process of Security Council referrals raises numerous procedural questions
for the operation of the new ICC. In order to have legal jurisdiction over a case, the
court must find, as a matter of law, that the criminal matters in question are
sufficiently grave as to be of importance to the international community.
47 If
another state objects and wants to prosecute the defendants in a national court, the
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ICC must determine whether the national prosecutions would be sincere, honest,
and effective. 48 But if the Security Council has required the referral to the ICC on
the basis of a Chapter VII finding that the situation implicates matters of collective
peace and security, is the ICC empowered to decide this question for itself, or must
it accept the Security Council's finding without any further discussion? No one really
knows. The Security Council is the highest law-making authority in the UN system
of international law, but what role its pronouncements should have in criminal
matters is entirely uncertain, because the Security Council, and international law in
general, has never before been so involved in the project of criminalizing and
punishing individual behavior. This process, begun in earnest at Nuremberg, has now
blossomed into a central focus of the international legal order; but not without
raising some serious concerns.
We achieve group justice by subjecting these unspeakable
crimes, perpetrated by the most horrendous of maligned
hearts, to the most banal and pedestrian processes of our
legal system.
The ICC, as I have argued elsewhere, is really, then, two courts in one.49 When
commencing an investigation after a referral from a state party to the Rome Statute,
the prosecutor has independent authority to base his prosecutorial decisions on pure
criminal law considerations. What is the wrongdoing here? Who should be put on
trial? What crime should they be charged with? Is this the appropriate legal forum in
which to conduct the prosecution? But when required to take on a case after a
Security Council referral, the ICC stops looking like a traditional criminal court. Of
course, it is still a criminal court in that it judges and punishes individual conduct, but
it is more than a criminal court if it is required to take cases when collective peace
and security demands it. One might think of this process as a hijacking of criminal
law by the international legal system to achieve the twin aims of international law:
trans-national peace and collective security. In such cases, the ICC looks less like a
pure criminal court and more like an organ of the United Nations, adjudicating
individual conduct only because it will promote some greater goal at the collective
level. One might call it a "security" court instead of a criminal court.5 0
None of this is meant to suggest that the process of Security Council referrals
is somehow regrettable or objectionable. Indeed, the Security Council should have
the authority to make binding referrals to the ICC in the wake of genocide or war
crimes. The underlying purpose in setting up the ICC was to create a successor court
to the ICTY and ICTR, which were truly ad hoc in nature. Their jurisdictions were
confined by date and geography, and their mandate will eventually expire.5' In their
place, the more general ICC will continue its work, prosecuting war crimes and
genocide wherever they may happen, with an institutional bureaucracy already in
place and ready to spring into action as circumstances require.
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The tension between special and ordinary justice at the ICC is not limited to
cases of Security Council referrals. Indeed, the two conceptions of transitional
justice come face to face in all aspects of the court's operation. On the one hand, the
ICC is operating as a traditional criminal court, concerned solely with the guilt or
innocence of the accused; nothing else matters. The trial must be conducted in
accordance with the basic principles of justice well known to all sophisticated
systems of criminal law. Although the substantive crimes being prosecuted are
horrific as compared with national penal systems-genocide instead of isolated
cases of murder, crimes against humanity instead of isolated cases of rape-this
cannot justify abrogation from the fundamental principles of criminal adjudication,
because these principles derive from the basic principles of justice. This is
transitional justice as ordinary justice.
However, the mere fact that the choice of cases is so dependent on geopolitical
considerations indicates that the ICC is jurisdictionally defined by transitional justice
as special justice. Although international criminal justice is pursued-or at least
ought to be pursued-with the same fidelity to the basic principles of justice as
domestic criminal law, it is nonetheless a different process, in a different location,
with different personalities. It is more than just a logical space with its own legal
precedents; it is a literal space, outside the boundaries of national law, designed to
deal with crimes that are inherently international 2 in character: genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and aggression.5 3 These are not just ordinary crimes. They
are extraordinary, requiring a sophisticated legal culture through which they are
defined and analyzed to determine standards of guilt, which defenses apply, and the
elements of each offense. This is the kind of transitional justice as special justice that
is entirely appropriate-and inescapable.
One sees this tension at the level of the substantive offenses. Genocide and
crimes against humanity are by their nature special, and some element of special
justice must be marshaled against them. They are by definition collective in nature.
The paradigm of genocide is the attempt by one ethnic group to destroy the other,
to annihilate them by forcing them from their homes and killing them. Genocide is
not simply the attempt by a single individual to kill another human being while being
motivated by racial animus. This is a hate crime, but it is not genocide.
Genocide must be backed up by a group plan, policy, or desire to wage
existential war on another ethnicity. This conception is borne out by history. During
the Holocaust, the Germans wanted to annihilate the Jews. Of course, one might
argue that it was only the Nazi leadership-or even just Hitler-that wanted to
destroy the Jews. But this reading of history is entirely insensitive to the fact that the
crime was not just racial in its definition of the victims, it was also racial in its
definition of the perpetrators. The Germans saw themselves as a superior Aryan race
that would wipe out the inferior Jewish people. One need not subscribe to
Goldhagen's controversial thesis that ordinary Germans supported the Holocaust to
understand this key point about the collective nature of the Holocaust.54
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Similarly, the Rwandan and Yugoslavian genocides of the most recent decade
were pursued by one group against another. The Hutu, as a group, desired the
destruction of the Tutsi, while the Serbians were motivated by a grand desire to expel
their enemies and create an ethnically homogenous Greater Serbia. To deny this
collective characteristic of the genocide is to engage in the most wishful of thinking.
There has been a tendency, since the Enlightenment, to interpret all action at the
level of individuals as rational agents, and to deny the ties that bind us together as
unfortunate holdovers of the Romantic era.55 But the history of the twentieth
century suggests that group ties are not only central to our daily lives in a national
culture, but also, regrettably, a contributing cause of genocide.
At the level of international criminal law there is some confusion on this point.
Several scholars have suggested that a defendant is guilty of genocide when he or she
commits a murder with the individual intent to destroy another ethnic group,
regardless of whether this murder is committed as part of a larger group plan. The
wording of the Rome Statute lends support to this position.5 6 Under this view, the
lone homicidal racist who kills one member of another race in the United States
would be guilty of genocide as long as he wants to destroy an entire race. It does not
matter, on this view, that there is no one else who shares the same genocidal plan.
While such an event would undoubtedly be horrible-and criminal-it does not fall
under our classic understanding of the term genocide. The crime of genocide is
irreducibly collective.5 7
Nonetheless, our modern system of international criminal justice can do
nothing to punish an entire ethnic group. Although some institutions of
international law are dedicated to adjudicating the actions of states and attributing
state responsibility where necessary (think of the ICJ), ad hoc and permanent
international criminal tribunals are limited to adjudicating the conduct of individuals.
Only individuals can stand trial before the ICC and only individuals have served jail
sentences handed down by the ICTY and ICTR. This is the essential project of
criminal law. To suggest otherwise, to claim that criminal trials should adjudicate the
actions of large groups, offends every Enlightenment principle we have about
criminal law. We do not punish individuals based on blood guilts 8 Although the
actions of the collectives to which they belong may bring upon them collective
shame and guilt, the actions of the group do not impose criminal liability on its
members (in the absence of specific, individual, culpable conduct). Therefore, this
constraint about criminal law is entirely necessary.
This presents a puzzle for transitional justice. The whole point of holding trials
in the wake of genocide is to repair the breach between warring ethnic groups. We
saw this in the jurisdictional analysis of the ad hoc tribunals and the new ICC; these
international criminal institutions gain their very legitimacy from the need to repair
these group conflicts. They carry the hope that ethnic groups victimized by genocide
can receive the justice they were denied on the battlefield, in the camps, or in the
ovens. This is special justice if ever there was. But how do we achieve this group
justice? We achieve it by plucking individuals from the chaos, holding out their
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actions as worthy of public condemnation, and warranting individual criminal
punishment. We achieve this justice by subjecting these unspeakable crimes,
perpetrated by the most horrendous of maligned hearts, to the most banal and
pedestrian processes of our legal system: rules of evidence, procedure, penal
statutes, and precedent. This is not an attempt to redress the balance between ethnic
groups, it is the technical and bureaucratic handling of the individual. This is
ordinary justice of the most ordinary kind. The two sides of transitional justice come
face to face in the ashes of genocide.
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